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WRONGS OF IGNORANCE AND AMBIGUITY: 
Lawyer Responsibility for Collective Misconduct 
 
William H. Simon* 
 
Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are key 
recurring themes in modern scandals from Watergate to Enron.  
Actors, especially lawyers, seek to limit responsibility by 
avoiding knowledge and clear articulation.  This essay 
considers this phenomenon from the point of view of both 
business organization and legal doctrine.  Evasive ignorance 
and ambiguity seem endemic to a particular organizational 
model and to a traditional model of legal responsibility.  
Developments in both law and business, however, suggest that 
these models are being superceded.  Many of the most dynamic 
businesses now emphasize practices of “transparency” 
designed to inhibit evasive ignorance and calculated ambiguity.  
A major trend in recent legal doctrine, strikingly exemplified by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, is to strengthen duties of inquiry and 
clear articulation.  The legal profession, however, has strongly 
resisted these trends with respect to its own regulation.  The 
essay argues that the bar’s opposition to many of the lawyer 
regulation initiatives under Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a 
misguided attachment to the privileges of non-accountability 
associated with deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity. 
 
 
 A distinctive set of ethical and regulatory issues arises 
where harmful conduct is ambiguous or the actors profess 
ignorance of its effects.  Such ambiguity or ignorance 
                                                 
*  Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.  I am grateful 
for help and encouragement to Lawrence Cunningham, Mike Dorf, George 
Fisher, Brad Karkkainen, Chuck Sabel, Rob Rosen, Jeff Gordon, Archon 
Fung, and Dara O'Rourke. 
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sometimes indicates inadvertence and blamelessness.  But 
because both law and social opinion hesitate to condemn 
ambiguous or ignorant conduct, actors are tempted to affect 
calculated ambiguity or deliberate ignorance in order to 
diminish accountability. 
 We are familiar with these practices from literature and 
history.  Shakespeare illustrates deliberate ignorance in Antony 
and Cleopatra.  When Menas asks Pompey for permission to 
kill Pompey's rivals for the chief magistracy of Rome, Pompey 
reproaches him: 
  Ah, this thou shouldst have done 
  And not spoken on't…. 
  … Being done unknown, 
  I should have found it afterwards well done, 
  But must condemn it now.1 
Henry II employed calculated ambiguity when he cried out, 
"Will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?", simultaneously 
prompting his knights to murder Thomas Becket and permitting 
Henry to deny that he intended such an extreme response.2 
 Both tropes recur in Hollywood portrayals of corrupt 
politics and organized crime.  Think of two of the best known 
moments in these films -- Captain Renault's claim in 
Casablanca to be "shocked – shocked!" that gambling is going 
on at Rick's café (deliberate ignorance), and Vito Corleone's 
statement in The Godfather about making "an offer he can't 
refuse" to the movie producer who resists giving a key role to 
Johnny Fontane (calculated ambiguity). 
 Issues of ignorance and ambiguity are prominent in some 
recent financial scandals, notably Enron.  Some of the most 
important provisions of the Enron-inspired Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
                                                 
1  II, 7, 77-84 
2  Simon Schama, A History of Britain: At the Edge of the World 3500 
B.C.- 1603 A.D. 141-42 (2000).  I quote the language of legend.  Schama 
says that Henry actually said something closer to, "What miserable drones 
and traitors have I nourished and brought up in my household who allow 
their lord to be treated with such shameful contempt by a low-born cleric!".   
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on corporate governance are addressed to such issues.  
Sarbanes-Oxley culminates an important trend toward norms 
that narrow the range for excuses based on ignorance and 
ambiguity by encouraging or requiring inquiry and articulation.  
Traditional ethics and liability norms left a broad range for such 
excuses, but the traditional approaches seem increasingly 
anachronistic, especially as applied to organized political and 
business conduct.   
Most significantly, business management styles have 
evolved in the past three decades to emphasize broad inquiry 
and clear articulation and to condemn ignorance and ambiguity 
as symptoms, not just of potential public irresponsibility, but of 
poor business performance.  Regulatory efforts that seek to 
enhance accountability by encouraging inquiry and articulation 
resonate with these business developments. 
 Nevertheless, these regulatory trends have not been 
uniformly welcomed by those subject to them, and there has 
been one pocket of especially fierce and successful resistance – 
the legal profession.  The profession's reaction to the regulation 
of lawyers mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley shows a reluctance to 
accept the kind of accountability the statute promotes and an 
apparent attachment to the privileges of ignorance and 
ambiguity. 
 Part I of this essay further illustrates deliberate ignorance 
and calculated ambiguity by recalling that they were 
emblematic of the wrongdoing in Watergate and then exploring 
their role in two major episodes of lawyer conduct in Enron.   
The next two parts consider the relation between these 
pathologies and organizational style and structure.  Part II 
reviews some accounts of modern corporate life that suggest 
that deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are 
encouraged by a particular model of organization that I call 
Ambivalent Bureaucracy.  Enron seems to have been an 
example of Ambivalent Bureaucracy, and the key weaknesses 
of this form of organization seem to have played a major role in 
its collapse.  Part III surveys recent trends that seem to be 
 4
eroding the prevalence of the Ambivalent Bureaucracy and 
promoting types of transparency and accountability that 
constrain ignorance and ambiguity.   
Part IV reviews a trend in legal regulation that parallels 
the evolution of business style and structure toward 
transparency and accountability.  The trend has strengthened 
and elaborated duties of inquiry and articulation.  Sarbanes-
Oxley stands as a striking confirmation of the trend.   
Finally, Part V shows that, compared to business 
managers and accountants, the legal profession remains an 
outlier in both the virulence and the success of its resistance to 
pressures to preclude deliberate ignorance and calculated 
ambiguity and the immunity from accountability they facilitate.  
Nevertheless, some aspects of the recent regulatory initiatives of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission have the potential to 
push the bar along the same path on which its corporate clients 
are traveling. 
 
 I. Ignorance and Ambiguity in Watergate and Enron 
 
 The behavior that offends us in public scandals is 
sometimes blatantly illegal.  On the other hand, it sometimes 
takes the form of socially obnoxious but inadvertently 
unregulated behavior – the exploitation of loopholes.  
Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are recurring 
behaviors that cut across both categories.  They are efforts to 
escape accountability either to the law or to social opinion for 
consequences that the actor should know are socially harmful.  
Such efforts were among the most salient and unattractive 
features of the wrongdoing in Watergate, and in more diluted 
form, they seem central to questions of lawyer conduct in 
Enron. 
 
 A. Watergate 
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 The most salient theme in the unsavory moral world of 
the Watergate participants is, not amorality or ruthlessness, but 
rather aversion to accountability.   The participants show 
intense faith in the immunizing power of deliberate ignorance 
and calculated ambiguity. 
 When Hugh Sloan, treasurer of the Committee to Re-
Elect the President (CREEP), asked campaign finance chairman 
Maurice Stans why Gordon Liddy had asked for $83,000, Stans 
replied "I do not want to know and you do not want to know".3  
(Liddy was planning the burglary of the Democratic National 
Committee headquarters.)  When Liddy’s accomplice Howard 
Hunt phoned presidential advisor Chuck Colson after the 
burglary, Colson "repeatedly insisted that he knew nothing 
about Watergate and wanted to keep it that way."4  At about the 
same time, Liddy approached Attorney General Richard 
Kleindienst on a golf course and said, "you've got to get my 
men out of jail.  Kleindienst said, "You get the hell out of here 
kid.  Whatever you have to say, just say to someone else."5  
When asked much later about charges that the Greek military 
dictatorship made secret contributions to Watergate-related 
activities, CIA Director Richard Helms replied, "Even if 
somebody suggests they would like to do it, I would insist that 
they don't tell me about it because that is dynamite."6  
 Ambiguity is an equally salient theme in Watergate 
discourse.  In his introduction to the tapes, R. W. Apple wrote, 
"The record is … so full of ambiguities and contradictions and 
elliptical language – a kind of White House code -- that 
definitive judgments will be difficult."7  Some of the ambiguity 
may be inadvertent or unconscious, reflecting anxiety or 
                                                 
3  Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard 
Nixon 355 (1990) [herinafter Wars].. 
4  Id. at 249. 
5  As reported by John Dean to Nixon.  New York Times, The White 
House Transcripts 142 (1974). 
6  Kutler, cited in note 3, at 206. 
7  New York Times, cited in note 5, at 4. 
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indecision.  In the very long discussion between Nixon and 
Dean about payment of hush money to the burglars, Nixon 
veers back and forth between approval and disapproval of the 
payments, leaving no impression of how the thought he had left 
the matter.8  
 But the participants often emphasize that ambiguity can 
be used deliberately to minimize accountability.  Did CREEP 
Chairman John Mitchell authorize the Watergate break-in?  
Nixon doubted that he would have done so in any way for 
which he could be held accountable: "Hell, [Mitchell] may have 
said, don't tell me about it, but you go ahead and do what you 
want.  But that doesn't take the rap you know."9  Did Chief of 
Staff Bob Haldeman?  John Dean had a similar doubt: "I think 
he knew there was a capacity to do this but he was not given 
specific direction."10  What about Colson?  Dean reports that, 
when Liddy and Hunt came to Colson to complain that CREEP 
chair Jeb Magruder was reluctant to approve their efforts, 
Colson called Magruder and said, "You all either fish or cut 
bait.  This is absurd to have these guys over there and not using 
them."  Dean assumed that Colson expected Magruder to 
interpret this as endorsement of the Liddy's and Hunt's burglary 
plan, but he also expected that Colson would deny it and "would 
probably get away with denying it."11 
 
 B. Deliberate Ignorance in Enron: The Vinson & Elkins 
Letter 
 
 After CEO Kenneth Lay received Sherron Watkins 
August 15, 2001, letter suggesting improper accounting and 
self-dealing, Enron's general counsel asked its principal outside 
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, to investigate.  Since Vinson & 
Elkins had played a major role in some of the relevant 
                                                 
8  New York Times, cited in noe5, at 132-80 (March 21, 1973).   
9  Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes 55 (Stanley Kutler ed. 1997). 
10  New York Times, cited in note 4, at 140. 
11  Id. at 137. 
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transactions, it had a conflict and should not have undertaken 
the assignment.12  For whatever reason, the investigation the 
firm conducted was notably circumspect.  As a board committee 
formed after the collapse concluded, "The result of the V & E 
review was largely predetermined by the scope and nature of 
the investigation and process employed."13  V & E's 
circumscription was especially notable in two broad areas. 
 First, the lawyers decided that they would not reconsider, 
or "second guess", Arthur Andersen's accounting judgments, 
nor would they seek independent accounting advice.14  In effect, 
the lawyers acted as if the Andersen accountants had sole 
responsibility for accounting judgments and their own 
responsibilities were limited to assuring that material facts were 
presented to the accountants.  This limitation was remarkable 
for at least two reasons. 
 One reason was that, under the relevant accounting 
standard, the most important determinant of accounting 
treatment was the extent to which Enron had retained control of 
rights and financial interests in the partnerships’ assets.  This 
was, as the accounting standard explicitly recognized, a legal 
question.15  Moreover, V & E had already given quite a bit of 
                                                 
12  See Roger Cramton, "Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on 
Legal and Ethical Issues," 58 The Business Lawyer 143, 163-67 (2002).  
Watkins in her letter had presciently warned Lay "can't use V & E due to 
conflict." Destruction of Enron Related Documents by Andersen Personnel, 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives, 
107th Congress, 2d Sess., Jan. 24, 2002,  at 39, 43. [herinafter Hearing}. 
13  William Powers, Jr., et al., "Report of Investigation by the Special 
Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp.," (Feb. 1, 
2002), at 176 (on file with author).   
14  Letter from Vinson & Elkins LLP, to James Derrick, Oct. 15, 2001, in 
id., at 46, 47. 
15  Financial Accounting Standards Board, “Accounting for Transfers 
and Services of Financial Assets, and Extinguishments of Liabilities,” 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 125 (1996), at par. 23 
(proper treatment depends on specified “factors pertinent under applicable 
law.”)  A revised standard governed the later Enron transactions, but the 
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advice and assistance in matters related to these issues.  
According to the Powers report, “management and the board 
relied heavily on the perceived approval by V & E of the 
structure and disclosure of the transactions.”16  Vinson & Elkins 
had given legal opinions in connection with similar transactions 
for the purposes of supporting the accounting treatment Enron 
sought.17  And it had given advice with respect to whether some 
of the transactions required elaboration in the “Management 
Discussion and Analysis” section of Enron’s securities filings.18 
 A further problem with V & E's deference to the 
accountants is that V & E's letter shows that its lawyers 
understood the accounting concerns raised by Watkins and later 
vindicated by the Powers report and many other critics.  In a 
concluding section entitled "Bad Cosmetics", it noted key 
objections to the accounting treatment, including the arguable 
facts that the special purpose entities were not truly independent 
and that they were insolvent, implying that the obligations from 
them that Enron showed on its books were valueless.19  The 
letter suggested that disclosure of further information might 
lead to lawsuits or bad publicity.  The letter clearly implies that, 
                                                                                                             
basic determinants were unchanged.  Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140: “Accounting for 
Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of 
Liabilities” (Sept. 2000). 
16  William Powers, Jr., et al., cited in note 13, at 26.  The fullest account 
of the lawyers’ activity is in In re Enron Corp, No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bkrpt. 
Ct. S.D.N.Y.), “Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner,” 
Appendix C (2003). 
   17  Enron declined to give an opinion with respect to whether the special 
purpose entity transactions were “true sales”, which was the legal issue 
central to accounting treatment.  It gave “true issuance” opinions with 
respect to some of the transactions.  These opinions were technically correct, 
but they did not support Enron’s accounting treatment.  It appears that 
Vinson & Elkins gave the opinions knowing that Enron and the accountants 
wanted them for the purpose of supporting their preferred treatment.  Id. at 
28-48. 
18         Id. at 48-52, 86-90. 
19  Hearing, cited in note  , at 53. 
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as long as the accountants "were comfortable" with these 
matters, such concerns were a matter of prudence within the 
discretion of the board, rather than legal duty.   
But the securities laws do not recognize any distinction 
between information that merely "looks" bad and information 
that really bears on performance.  The issue under these laws is 
whether information is the type that a "reasonable investor" 
would be influenced by.  A reasonable investor cares about 
information that would be likely to cause price movements.20  
Thus, one might argue that "Bad Cosmetics" was by definition a 
violation of the securities law materiality standard.  At the least, 
this was a legal question that a business lawyer should have 
considered.  Yet, V & E failed to do so. 
 The other area of V & E's self-imposed ignorance 
concerned allegations of improper self-dealing.  With regard to 
these issues, the Powers Committee faulted the lawyers for 
speaking only to ten, mostly senior, people at Enron and 
Andersen, "who, with a few exceptions, had professional and 
personal stakes in the matters under review."21  The Committee 
suggested that more junior employees or former employees 
might have provided more disinterested information.   
Although the report does not charge V & E with it, 
another striking omission appears there.  Just as they took 
                                                 
20  See TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(materiality standard is what "reasonable investor" would consider 
significant); Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (investors can be 
assumed to rely on soundness of public market prices).   There may be a 
paradox here because the principle implies that a reasonable investor would 
be interested in matters of concern to unreasonable investors to the extent 
that the decisions of the latter affected prices.  But the securities laws seem 
comfortable with this position.   
 Although sparse and dated, the relevant authority indicated that 
compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles would not 
exonerate an otherwise misleading statement.  See United States v. Simon, 
425 F.2d 796, 805-07 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.); Thomas L. Hazen, 
Securities Regulation 610-11 (4th ed. 2002). 
21  Powers et al, cited in note 15, at 177. 
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approval of financial statements by the accountants as 
conclusive and sought only to ascertain if the accountants were 
aware of the facts, so they took approval of the LJM 
transactions by the board as conclusive and sought only to 
ascertain compliance with approval processes.  At the times it 
approved the LJM structures, the Board recognized the deals 
would require a waiver of Enron's ethics code and it conditioned 
the waiver on review and approval of each deal by the chief 
accounting and risk officers and an annual review of completed 
deals by the board's audit, finance, and compensation 
committees.  The chief accounting and risk officers were both 
subordinate to Fastow; so their approval could not have been 
expected to be a strong check.  The Audit Committee review 
was thus of central importance.  In its letter, V & E concluded 
that "it appears" that the mandated review had occurred at the 
end of the two annual periods since the LJMs were 
established.22 
 In fact, the Powers report found that board committee 
review was cursory and based on mistaken assumptions.  The 
board vastly overestimated the degree of scrutiny that the chief 
accounting and risk officers were giving to the deals and 
wrongly thought that CEO Jeffrey Skilling was approving them.  
Important information on the substance of the transactions was 
withheld from the board.  Most important, 
 
 the annual reviews of LJM transactions by the 
Audit and Compliance Committeee (and later also the 
Finance Committeee) appear to have involved only brief 
presentations by Management (with Andersen present at 
the Audict Committee) and did not involve any 
meaningful examination of the terms of the transactions.  
Moreover, even though the Board Committee-mandated 
procedures required a review by the Compensation 
Committee of Fastow's compensation from the 
                                                 
22  Hearing, cited in note 12, at 50. 
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partnerships, neither the Board nor Senior Management 
asked Fastow for the amount of his LJM-related 
compensation until October 2001, after media reports 
focused on Fastow's role in LJM.23 
  
 V & E's failure to recognize the weakness of the board's 
review seems to arise from a decision to assess the board's 
efforts on the basis of documents.  V & E decided not to 
interview Board members on the extent of their efforts or 
understanding.  (After V & E concluded its report, it gave a 
verbal summary of its conclusions to the Audit Committee, but 
this meeting seems to have involved re-assurance, rather than 
probing.)   
 V & E's failure to interview board members responsible 
for reviewing the transactions surely rivals the firm's more 
prominently condemned misjudgments.  Given the 
pervasiveness of managerial conflicts, board committee review 
was a critical safeguard, and the board itself seemed to have so 
deemed it at the time it authorized dealings with the 
partnerships.  It was not plausible to think that the quality of 
this review could be assessed on the basis of documentary 
records. 
 No doubt lawyers do not casually seek to interview 
members of the board of a major corporate client, but V & E 
itself recognized that the stakes in this matter were 
extraordinarily high, and it should have recognized that the 
board's role was critical.  Thus, the question arises whether its 
efforts might have been inhibited by a desire to avoid receiving 
or giving information.  Perhaps Lay or the lawyers themselves 
did not want to take the risk of learning that the board's 
consideration had been inadequate, since such knowledge might 
have intensified their own responsibilities.  Perhaps the lawyers 
sense that, if the board knew little about the transactions, it was 
because its members preferred it that way, and they did not 
                                                 
23  Powers, cited in note 12, at 11. 
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want to take the risk of burdening them with unwanted 
knowledge. 
 
C. Calculated Ambiguity in Enron: The Temple Memo 
 
 On October 12, 2001, knowing that an SEC investigation 
of the Enron audits was likely in the near future, Nancy Temple 
sent an e-mail to Michael Odom.  The text read: 
 
 Mike – 
 It might be useful to consider reminding the 
engagement team of our documentation and retention 
policy.  It will be helpful to make sure that we have 
complied with the policy.  Let me know if you have any 
questions. 
 Nancy 
 
It concluded with the URL of the Andersen policy on its web 
site.24 
 Temple was a lawyer in the legal office of Andersen's 
Chicago headquarters.  Odom was director of Andersen's 
Houston office.  Odom promptly forwarded the message to 
David Duncan, the "engagement partner" on the Enron account.  
A few days later Duncan organized  the shredding of more 
3,500 pounds of Enron-related documents.  Duncan 
subsequently pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in 
connection with the shredding, and he testified at Andersen's 
criminal trial that his decision to shred had been influenced by 
the Temple memo. 
 Temple denies that her memo was calculated to encourage 
destruction.  She testified to a Congressional panel that she 
intended simply that Odom and Duncan follow the policy.  
According to her, it was Duncan's responsibility as engagement 
                                                 
24  Hearing, cited in note 12, at 45. 
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partner, to interpret the policy and to make inquiries if he had 
any difficulty doing so.25  
 Temple's account was incredible as a description either of 
the relative responsibilities of lawyer and client in this situation 
or of Temple's motives.  Lawyers are trained and paid to be 
advisors, not archivists.  Their job is to tell clients what the 
rules require them to do, not simply to pass them along.  
Moreover, the Andersen policy was, as the firm itself later 
conceded, "not a model of lucidity".26  It was 10 pages long, 
turgidly written, and ambiguous in key respects.  It stated that 
audit work papers should be preserved for six years and that, "In 
case of threatened litigation, no related information will be 
destroyed."  On the other hand, it also stated that "drafts and 
preliminary versions of information should be destroyed," that 
personnel should "eliminate or destroy [client information] 
when no longer needed," and that "only essential information to 
support or conclusions should be retained."  It did not specify 
the priority of these competing injunctions.27  Thus, it was at 
least risky to leave interpretation to a lay person.  And what was 
almost certainly the most prudent advice for a lawyer to give on 
October 12 – preserve all Enron-related materials until further 
notice – was not very difficult to formulate.  
 There are two possible interpretations of the ambiguity of 
Temple's memo.  Many believe that she intended to encourage 
tacitly destruction of Enron documents.28  There is much to be 
said for this interpretation.  Andersen had suffered large losses 
in several recent lawsuits, and an attitude of bitterness and 
                                                 
25  For Temple's Congressional testimony, see Hearing, cited in note 12, 
at 118-68; see especially 137-38.; on Duncan's trial testimony, see Jonathan 
Weil and Alexei Barrionuevo, "In the Balance: As Trial Nears End, 
Andersen Proves Surprisingly Tough," Wall Street Journal (June 4, 2002), at 
A1. 
26  Prepared Statement of C.E. Andrews, Global Managing Partner, 
Arthur Andersen, in Hearing, cited in note 12, at 33. 
27  The policy appears in Hearing, cited in note 12, at 79-105. 
28  This was the prosecutors' argument in the Andersen criminal trial.  
See Weil and Barrionuevo, cited in note 25. 
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wariness toward litigation appears to have been pervasive.  
Odom had explicitly urged destruction of documents in 
anticipation of litigation a couple of days before Temple wrote 
(although there's no indication that Temple was aware of this).29 
 But another equally plausible interpretation is that Temple 
was uncertain about aspects of the policy or about what advice 
she should give.  Temple's testimony to Congress suggested that 
she was not sure even by that point what Andersen’s duties 
were.30  She also pointed out that the policy explicitly gave the 
engagement partner the duty to interpret and apply it.  A simple 
warning not to destroy Enron-related documents might prompt 
detailed inquiries about specific documents that would have 
been difficult to answer.  Moreover, Temple might have worried 
that even clear and accurate advice would have been 
unwelcome.  Such advice sometimes limits the recipient's later 
ability to claim excusable mistake. 
 Regardless of which interpretation we accept, there 
remains the further question of why Andersen's policy was itself 
ambiguous.  Casual or amateurish drafting is certainly one 
explanation.  On the other hand, the bad litigation experiences 
that led Andersen to focus on the document retention issue 
might have been expected to induce careful thinking about the 
matter.  A more likely explanation lies in the tensions inherent 
in document destruction strategy generally.  These tensions 
create strong pressures against clarity. 
 The drafter of a corporate policy faces the following 
problem: After she has specified which documents the company 
                                                 
29  Id. 
30  Rep. Markey: Is it your legal opinion that Andersen is free to shred 
documents relating to its work for Enron until such time as it actually 
receives a subpoena from the SEC, or formally named as a defendant in a 
class action lawsuit by Enron's employees or other investors? 
 Ms. Temple: I have not reached that legal question. 
 Rep. Markey: What was your view at the time? 
 Ms. Temple: I was not asked … to reach a legal opinion at any 
particular time …. 
Hearing, cited in note 12, at 150.   
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is legally obliged to retain – e.g., documents likely be sought in 
imminent litigation – she needs to indicate which of the 
remaining documents should be retained and which destroyed.  
In principle, she would like to retain helpful documents and 
destroy harmful ones.  But it is impossible to fully anticipate in 
advance which documents will fall into these categories or to 
effectively express her expectations in precise rules.  Thus, she 
is pushed to leave discretion for ad hoc decision-making under 
an open-ended standard that prescribes destruction when the 
document is likely to be harmful.  Ad hoc decision-making, 
however, has especially severe disadvantages in this context.  
For one thing, it means that local decision-makers will have to 
make difficult judgments for which they will not always be 
qualified.  For another, evidence law provides that, when a party 
has destroyed documents pertinent to a claim, the trier may infer 
that the documents would have supported the adverse party's 
position.31  Ad hoc decisions under a harmfulness standard are 
more likely to encourage such inferences, since such decisions 
will suggest that the decisionmaker specifically determined that 
the document was harmful.   
 In this situation, the policy-maker may be inclined to 
ambiguity for two distinct reasons that parallel the 
interpretations of the Temple memo.  First, an ambiguous 
policy might seem likely to produce the most litigation 
advantage.  It leaves discretion to local decisionmakers.  If they 
understand tacitly that the goal is to eliminate harmful material, 
they will exercise their discretion accordingly, but the absence 
of an explicit standard will make it easier to portray the 
destruction as motivated by something other than a sense of 
culpability. 
 Second, an ambiguous policy might seem to allow the 
policymaker to avoid sticking her neck out in a situation where 
there are large risks.  A clear rule-based policy runs large risks 
of over-inclusion (documents that turn out to be desperately 
                                                 
31  See 2 Wigmore on Evidence sec. 291 (James Chadbourn rev. 1979). 
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needed get destroyed) or under-inclusion (documents that turn 
out to be smoking guns are preserved).  A clear standards-based 
policy risks embarrassing adverse inferences from destruction.  
A policymaker might fear that, should some extreme version of 
these bad outcomes occur, hindsight bias or opportunism might 
cause others to blame her.  An ambiguous policy has the same 
risks, but it has the compensating advantage that it increases the 
policy-maker's chance to claim that she did not intend or foresee 
the bad consequence and to blame the local decisionmakers for 
it. 
   
 
 D. Liability 
 
 Clearly in Watergate and apparently in Enron, key 
participants sought immunity through ignorance and ambiguity.  
In Watergate, they were largely unsuccessful.  The two Enron 
episodes described here have not been fully resolved, but the 
participants have already suffered reputational damage and face 
prospects of liability. 
In the Andersen criminal prosecution, the government 
argued that Temple's letter was intended to encourage document 
destruction and hence an act of obstruction of justice.  Although 
some jurors may have agreed, the jury as a whole did not.  Its 
conviction was based on another episode involving Ms. 
Temple.32  It remains possible that Temple will face individual 
criminal charges.  It is also arguable that her advice, if not 
obstruction of justice, was malpractice.  Such a claim seems 
unlikely as a practical matter, but in different circumstances, she 
                                                 
32  According to the special verdict form, the conviction was based on an 
episode in which Temple advised Duncan to alter a memorandum of a 
conference with an Enron manager to remove indications that Duncan had 
advised against making a certain statement and that Temple had received the 
memo.  See Jonathan Weil, Alexei Barrionuevo, and Cassell Bryan-Low, 
"Auditor's Ruling: Andersen Case Lifts U.S. Enron Case," Wall Street 
Journal (June 17, 2002), at A1. 
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might have been faced with a negligence claim from the client 
(or its successor). 
The pending civil damage action against Vinson & 
Elkins alleges that the letter to Derrick amounted to fraud, as an 
effort to cover-up the deceptions in the original transactions.33  
The bankruptcy examiner suggested that evidence concerning 
the firm's conduct of the Watkins investigation would support a 
malpractice claim.34 
 Thus, in both Watergate and Enron, it is not clear that 
the pre-existing liability rules failed to adequately address the 
conduct in question.  Nevertheless, a natural response has been 
to tighten prohibitions and increase sanctions.  And as with 
Watergate, another response has been exhortation against the 
misconduct.  To the extent that misconduct is not a matter 
simply of rational calculation but of acculturated instinct, 
exhortation may be responsive.  Thus, it is pertinent to consider 
the relative influences of strategy and culture. 
 
 II. Organizational Pressures: Ambivalent Bureaucracy 
 
 Many accounts of the structure of business organization 
take notice of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity 
and attribute these phenomena to distinctive organizational 
pressures.  In some accounts, these pressures are endemic to a 
style and structure of business organization that was dominant 
until recently and was evident in Enron and Arthur Andersen. 
 Ambivalent Bureaucracy is my name for the most salient 
model in the academic literature on American business 
organization of the last century.  This model asserts that there is 
a strong and inevitable gulf in large organizations between two 
regimes of order – a formal one and an informal one.  The 
formal one is a bureaucracy of the sort described by Max Weber 
– a hierarchical organization of narrowly specialized roles 
                                                 
33  Newby v. Enron Corporation, 2002 WL 31973134, at 64-66 
(S.D.Tex. 2002) (describing complaint). 
34  Appendix C, cited in note  , at 185-87. 
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governed by rules.  The behavior of rank-and-file agents is 
controlled through rules promulgated by top managers.  The 
informal order is made up of tacit norms and personal 
relationships.  The informal order arises because the formal one 
is insufficient.  A major problem is that the top managers lack 
the information about the production process necessary to 
promulgate and update rules of adequate specificity for rank-
and-file agents, and they lack the information about the 
behavior of the agents needed to monitor their compliance.35  
How the informal rules respond to these deficiencies varies 
among accounts, but many accounts suggest an important role 
for deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity.  In particular, 
they suggest both a cultural account and a strategic account of 
these phenomena. 
 
 A.  Culture 
 
 By some accounts, the informal order of the Ambivalently 
Bureaucratic business organization is characterized by 
hierarchical networks of personal deference and loyalty.    A 
participant's most fundamental obligation is to serve his 
immediate superior, and this means, not necessarily compliance 
with the organization's express rules or even the superior's 
express commands, but catering to her unspoken desires.36  
These relations are fluid because people typically move from 
job to job within them.  The identity of one's superiors changes.  
Thus, one has to be fairly adept at shifting allegiances and at 
reading the unspoken concerns of different people. 
 Ignorance and ambiguity have important uses in such a 
culture.  A participant needs to avoid certain types of 
                                                 
35  See, e.g., Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (1954); 
Chester Bernard, The Functions of the Executive (1938). 
36  The locus classicus of this view is William H. Whyte, Jr., The 
Organization Man (1956).  The themes with which this paper is concerned 
are best developed in Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate 
Managers 101-61(1988). 
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knowledge because it triggers responsibilities under the explicit 
rules that would conflict with the unspoken desires of a 
superior.  Knowledge of wrongdoing by the superior or 
knowledge that might reflect adversely on the superior that 
would trigger reporting obligations are the most serious 
examples.  Information about risks and uncertainties about 
which it appears that there is little that can be done is sometimes 
another.  Just as the participant avoids knowledge that is 
unhelpful to her, so she refrains from transmitting information 
to the superior that the superior does not want to hear, 
information that would trigger unwelcome duties or induce 
anxieties on the part of the superior. 
In these accounts, managers would prefer not to take 
responsibility for decisions involving risk or uncertainty.  They 
tend to tacitly delegate such matters downward, forcing 
subordinates to resolve them without explicit guidance.  
Subordinates perceive that managers do not want information 
that would force them to confront such matters directly.37  In 
addition, 
 
most bosses simply do not want to hear bad news.  Bad 
news either requires action, always open to multiple and 
perhaps pejorative interpretations, or it upsets pre-
established plans of action, scattering ducks already set in 
a row.  Besides one can only criticize something when 
one has the resources to solve it in a clear and decisive 
way.  Otherwise, one should keep one's skepticism to 
oneself and get "on board."38 
 
 Ambiguity is a critical tool of flexibility.  The participant 
wants to keep his commitments tacit so he can modify and shift 
them as circumstances and relationships change.  He prefers to 
speak imprecisely and off-the-record so as not to limit his 
                                                 
37  W. Morris, Decentralization in Management Systems 53 (1968). 
38  Jackall, cited in note 36, at 118. 
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freedom to re-characterize his commitments in retrospect and or 
to change them prospectively.39  "Within the corporation, 
subordinates often have to protect their bosses' 'deniability' by 
concealing the specific dimensions of a problem in abstract, 
empty terms, maximizing the number of possible subsequent 
interpretations."40 
 There are a variety of functional explanations for this 
culture.  It makes possible a limited kind of mutual recognition 
and support where deeper kinds are not possible.  It allays the 
anxiety that is naturally associated with uncertainty.  Its 
practices strike individuals as strategies for material success.  
However, part of what we mean in calling this explanation 
cultural is that people engage in these practices more or less 
unreflectively.  They may initially adopt and periodically re-
affirm the practices on instrumental grounds – as means to 
material reward – but the practices do not remain a matter of 
ongoing calculation.  Often the practices become habitual and 
persist even after the environmental contingencies that made 
them strategically plausible have changed.  If the culture fails to 
adapt to such change, the practices become dysfunctional.  
Thus, on this cultural view, it is no surprise that people 
sometimes behave in ways that depart from rational assessment 
of their material interests.  Either they have sacrificed these 
interests to the emotional needs served by the practices, or the 
culture has blinded them to the environmental changes that have 
decreased the strategic effectiveness of the practices. 
 Although Watergate took place in the context of a 
political organization rather than a business one, this cultural 
                                                 
39  Jackall writes of one of his subjects, who came to grief by flouting 
the norms of this culture: 
 He tried to fix responsibility for action, a tactic certain to shatter the 
trust required to maintain a kind of cooperative nonaccountability.  He 
put things into writing in a world that, apart from ritual nods to the 
importance of documentation, actually fosters ambiguity by its reliance 
on talk as the basic mode of negotiation and command. Id. at 118 
40  Id. at 136. 
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interpretation fits it quite well.  Personal loyalty is clearly the 
most basic norm for the Watergate participants.  The tapes show 
Nixon's preoccupation with retaliation against those who are 
disloyal to him.  The participants repeatedly conflate virtue with 
sensitivity and commitment to the needs of Nixon and his close 
advisors.  They describe their goal as the protection of "the 
Presidency", but they conflate the interests of the institution 
with those of its incumbent.  The idea that exposure of White 
House wrongdoing might hurt only Nixon, and not his office, 
invariably eludes them.41   
 The tapes also illustrate the fluidity of this ethos.  As the 
collaborators perceive that some will have to be sacrificed, and 
as some defect and offer testimony against the White House, 
loyalties shift drastically.  Former team players become 
casualties or traitors, who no longer show or can expect loyalty.   
 We don't know enough about Enron and Arthur Andersen 
to assess the pertinence of this cultural explanation, but there 
are some indications that it may prove helpful.  In contrast to 
the strategic explanation we consider next, cultural explanations 
have some ability to account for behavior that seems against the 
actor's self-interest.  At least some of the conduct in Enron 
seems of this kind.  In particular, Nancy Temple's conduct is 
hard to account for in rational strategic terms.  She knew that 
inquiry was likely and that her e-mail advice would almost 
certainly be discovered in the event the inquiry became at all 
extensive.  It seems very doubtful that whatever personal stake 
she might have thought she was protecting by sending the e-
mail could have been of a magnitude to warrant the risk she ran.  
Thus, in our present state of knowledge, it seems plausible to 
see this as the kind of unreflective, self-protective ambiguity 
encouraged by the corporate culture of amoral personalism. 
  
 B. Strategy   
 
                                                 
41  See Kutler, intro to Abuse of Power 
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 Criminal or tort liability for intentional wrongdoing 
typically requires proof of an element of intent and an element 
of conduct.  In the organizational context, the conduct is often a 
statement.  In the case of fraud, a false statement; or in the case 
of other wrongs, a statement instructing or authorizing a 
subordinate to engage in some further wrongful act.  Intent is 
often an inference from knowledge.  With fraud, if the person 
knows facts that make the statement fraudulent, the intent to 
deceive can be inferred.  With acts committed by subordinates, 
intent can be inferred from knowledge of facts that make it 
likely that the subordinate will respond to the statement by 
doing the wrongful act.   
   In the organizational context, a perennial strategy of 
those in control for avoiding this type of liability is to 
encourage subordinates to engage in wrongful conduct only 
indirectly or ambiguously and to avoid receiving information 
about it.  The controllers can do this by structuring the 
organization in a way that creates tacit pressures for such 
behavior.  The key elements of such a strategy are 
decentralization coupled with selective incentives.  The 
subordinate receives rewards or penalties based on evidence of 
a narrow range of performance – for example, sales volume or 
profits, but has wide discretion with respect to other aspects of 
his performance.  Discretion does not have to be explicit.  It can 
arise from the silence of the organization's rules or from their 
selective enforcement. Thus, the controllers can promulgate 
rules forbidding illegal conduct – say, bribery or pollution – but 
tacitly nullify the rules by failing to monitor compliance or 
sanction violations.   
 A liability regime predicated on evidence of direct 
knowledge and explicit encouragement will have difficulty 
imposing sanctions against the organization as a whole or the 
controllers in such a situation.  In fact, the knowledge and 
conduct requirements for liability have not been so strict as to 
preclude liability in this situation.  Nevertheless, managers can 
sometimes reduce their risk of individual liability by a strategy 
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of tacit encouragement and enforced ignorance (though, as we 
will shortly acknowledge, the potential gain has been 
considerably eroded in recent years42). 
 Of course, in this scenario, the subordinates will be fully 
chargeable with knowledge and explicit misconduct.  The 
implicit bargain between them and the controllers will be 
plausible only if the latter anticipate compensation for the 
greater risks they assume.  However, the fact that they are likely 
to be poor relative to the controllers facilitates agreement.  The 
relative poverty of the subordinates means, first, that they have 
less wealth to lose in the event of failure, and perhaps second, 
that the marginal value of prospective material gain is higher to 
them (that is, they will demand less compensation than the more 
wealthy controllers for running a given amount of risk). 
 The relatively low status of the Watergate burglars and of 
John Dean, the White House lawyer who negotiated for their 
silence, seems consistent with this strategy.  Their low status 
seems to have made them attractive both because it facilitated 
denial of knowledge by their superiors and because it was likely 
to motivate them to take the necessary risks.43  Of course, 
Watergate also illustrates the central weakness of the strategy: 
Since the controllers, in order to preserve their claim of 
ignorance and non-authorization must limit monitoring, they 
run an increased risk that the subordinates will perform 
incompetently or take excessive risks. 
 Some elements of corporate scandals also resonate this 
perspective.  In his 1977 survey of the subject, Jack Coffee 
looked at the spate of then recent scandals involving illegal 
payments to foreign government officials and an earlier group 
involving price fixing.  Among the recurring characteristics he 
found are those that make our strategy.  The active wrongdoers 
were generally middle or lower-level managers.  Corporate 
policies were either silent about the practices or they were 
                                                 
42  See text at notes    below. 
43  See Abuse of Power, at 54 (Haldeman referring to Liddy as "some 
little lawyer trying to make a name for himself"); NYT cite re Dean 
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unenforced.  Monitoring was lax, and there were sometimes 
informal sanctions for reporting lower-level misconduct outside 
the chain of command.  The actors were compensated or 
evaluated on the basis of indicators such as sales or profits that 
would be moved in their favor by the practices.44   
 At Enron, we find a chief financial officer – Fastow -- 
given extraordinary discretion and high-powered incentives 
contingent on a fairly narrow set of indicators, coupled with 
disinclination on the part of his superiors to monitor that, given 
the subordinate's incentives and the corporate stakes, would 
seem amazing from any perspective other than the one we are 
considering.   
 Andersen also seems to have had a remarkable degree of 
decentralization.  Duncan and his engagement team in Houston 
were bound to Enron by strong incentive compensation.  It 
appears that central oversight at Andersen was so weak that 
when an internal audit partner from Chicago headquarters 
warned of problems with the Enron accounting, the Houston 
team was able to have him removed.45  And Andersen had no 
procedures for central monitoring its auditors' compliance with 
its document retention policies.  It left such matters up to the 
engagement partner.46 
 Moreover, the effort by Enron's senior executives and 
Vinson & Elkins to shift ostensible responsibility for the critical 
accounting judgments to Andersen seems consistent with the 
pattern.  As we have seen, the key judgments involved legal 
matters that the lawyers should have been competent to assess.  
As among the executives and professionals involved, the 
accountants were the least compensated, least prestigious, and 
                                                 
44  John C. Coffee, Jr., "Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a 
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal 
Response," 63 Michigan Law Review 1099, 1104-09, 1125-32 (1977).   
45  Robert Manor & Jon Yates, "Faceless Andersen Partner in Spotlight's 
Glare: David Duncan Vital to Federal Probe After Plea," Chicago Tribune 
(April 14, 2002), at C1. 
46  Hearing, cited in note    , at 134, 138 (testimony of Nancy Temple). 
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least credentialed.47  On any functional view, assigning them 
responsibility to make the most difficult reporting judgments 
unilaterally would make little sense.  But their relative poverty 
made them best qualified to run the risks of public sanction for 
misconduct.  
  
 C.  Culture and Strategy: Professional Duty to 
Organizations 
 
 Problems of ambiguity and ignorance take on a different 
cast in the context of the dealings between professionals and 
their clients.  Both as a matter of tort liability and as a matter of 
professional discipline, lawyers owe their clients duties of care 
and loyalty.  These duties impose affirmative burdens both to 
communicate clearly to the client and to acquire information.  
Unlike the situation with arm's length dealings, the lawyer 
cannot satisfy these duties by remaining silent.  She generally 
cannot blame the client for the client's predictable 
misunderstanding of the lawyer's literally accurate but 
knowingly misleading statement.  And she must undertake 
reasonable research to develop information needed to make her 
advice effective. 
 Clearly these doctrines are intended to obviate the 
problems of ambiguity and ignorance.  Nevertheless, when the 
client is an organization, ambiguity recurs from a different 
angle.  The problem now arises from the difficulty of 
identifying the client.  An organization is an abstraction; 
lawyers can deal with organizations only through their 
individual constituents.  They need norms to tell them how to 
identify from among the various actors who purport to speak for 
the corporation those on whom they should bestow the care and 
loyalty due a client. 
                                                 
47  cites 
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 This is not the place for a full account of these issues,48 
but we can readily note the most salient ambiguity in the bar's 
response.  On the one hand, lawyers tend to identify the 
organizational client with the managers with whom they deal 
personally.  This tendency resonates strongly with both the 
cultural and strategic considerations we considered above.  
Lawyers take the same psychological satisfactions in personal 
loyalty and deference as business executives.  And lawyers have 
a clear strategic interest in pleasing the executives with whom 
they deal, since these executives will most likely make 
decisions about the lawyers' future retention.  As a matter of 
substantive law, this tendency seems justifiable in the most 
common situations where managers purport to speak for the 
organization and there is no reason to doubt their authority.   
 But identifying the organization with its managers is not 
appropriate where managers are violating the corporation's own 
norms or knowingly harming the interests of its constituents.  In 
such situations the tendency of recent doctrine is to point to the 
board.  The board has broad strategic and oversight 
responsibility for the enterprise.  Thus, when managers are 
acting ultra vires, the lawyer can serve the organizational client 
by going to the board.   
However, as a practical matter, this course is often 
costly to the lawyer, especially where she has no strong prior 
relation with the board.  The lawyer who goes over the head of 
the misbehaving manager is likely to ruin his relation with her 
and risk her future employment prospects with the firm.  The 
latter risk seems particularly severe if we recall the lesson of 
organizational scholarship that the board may not be grateful for 
the lawyer's intervention.  Informing the board may trigger 
responsibilities that the board might prefer not to have.   
 In addition, we need to consider the situation where the 
board knows of the wrongdoing and, whether because of 
                                                 
48  For a fuller treatment, see William H. Simon, "Whom (or What) Does 
the Organization's Lawyer Represent?," 91 California Law Review 57 
(2003). 
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incompetence or complicity, acquiesces in or encourages it.  At 
this point, it becomes implausible, as a matter of principle, to 
identify the client with its board.  On the other hand, as a 
practical matter, the alternatives – going to constituents 
(shareholders) or an agency charged with protecting them, such 
as the SEC, seem awkward and radical.  In a private 
corporation, shareholders might be contacted discretely, but in a 
public corporation, communicating with shareholders would 
involve public disclosure.   
Surely there are situations where such public disclosure 
is the best way for the lawyer to protect the interests of the 
organizational client, but lawyers are deeply uncomfortable 
with such a course.  As a cultural matter, lawyers are so 
viscerally habituated to thinking of clients in terms of personal 
relations and to thinking of confidentiality as the core ethical 
obligation that it is hard for them to appreciate the logic of the 
notion that loyalty to the client might require going public.  As 
a strategic matter, going public will antagonize anyone in the 
organization with any power to allocate legal business and will 
send a signal to managers of other enterprises who might 
employ the lawyer that they cannot count on the lawyer's 
loyalty to them individually.   
 So the issues of organizational loyalty are difficult as 
matters of principle, culture, and strategy.  On the one hand, it is 
untenable to assert that the organizational lawyer should always 
serve management.  On the other hand, duties to go beyond 
management require difficult judgments and involve personal 
costs for the lawyer.  In this situation, the bar's response has 
been to acknowledge the principle that the organization to 
which lawyers owe loyalty is something different from its 
managers, but to keep ambiguous the scope of duty to 
constituents other than managers. 
 We see this preference for ambiguity in the bar's principal 
response to these issues – Model Rule of Professional 
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Responsibility 1.13, first promulgated in 1983.49  Prior to this 
rule, although lawyers had always represented organizations 
and public corporate work had been a major component of the 
law practice for more than a century, there was virtually no 
doctrine at all on the distinctive duties of counsel to an 
organization.  In terms of clarifying lawyer duty, the Rule was 
not much of an improvement.  It started by asserting plausibly 
that the lawyer represents the organization "acting through its 
duly authorized agents", but then it meandered into evasiveness 
when it came to the critical situations in which agents are acting 
ultra vires.  In cases of wrongdoing, it prescribed, superfluously, 
that the lawyer act “in the best interests of the organization", 
indicating that this “may” involve going to the “highest 
authority that can act on behalf of the organization.”  It 
provided no guidance as to when the lawyer should climb the 
ladder.  The “highest authority” was undefined, so it was 
unclear whether it might ever include shareholders.  The rule 
could be interpreted to forbid reporting wrongdoing outside the 
organization, but it was ambiguous on this point as well. 
 For twenty years, there was virtually no official effort to 
clarify these ambiguities.  The ABA amended the rule in August 
2003 only after Congress and the SEC had intervened with the 
attorney conduct provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
implementing regulations.50  And its revisions were the 
minimum (or perhaps less than the minimum51) needed to avoid 
                                                 
49  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 in Stephen Gillers 
and Roy Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 2001 163-
64. 
50  ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13, as amended, August, 
2003, available at www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/new_rule_1.13.pdf.  15 U.S.C. 
7202, 7245, 7262 (attorney conduct provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
1992); 17 C.F.R. 205.3 
51  The Sarbanes-Oxley “up-the-ladder” provision seems broader and 
stricter than the amended rule.  The new rule mandates reporting only when 
the lawyer “knows” both that illegal conduct has or will occur and that it is 
likely to inflict harm on the organization. Sarbanes-Oxley mandates 
reporting whenever the lawyer “becomes aware of evidence” of a material 
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pre-emption by the Sarbanes-Oxley rules.  Like Sarbanes-
Oxley, the new rule makes going up-the-ladder to the “highest 
authority” mandatory in certain circumstances, and it permits 
outside disclosure of wrongdoing to prevent future harm to the 
corporation.  But all the ambiguities that had not been 
independently clarified by Sarbanes-Oxley were retained.  The 
“highest authority” remains undefined.  The lawyer’s 
responsibilities with respect to past wrongdoing is unspecified.  
There is still no indication as to how the lawyer is to exercise 
her discretion to disclose to avoid future harm.  
  
 III. The Changing Influence of Corporate Structure: Self-
Conscious Bureaucracy 
 
 In his 1977 article on corporate wrongdoing, Jack Coffee 
took account of the observations of organization theory about 
the limited information and control of senior managers over 
corporate agents and the consequent strategic and cultural 
effects inhibiting compliance with public norms.  He argued, 
further, that the problems of limited information and control 
inherent in any large bureaucratic structure were intensified by 
the multidivisional form that the large corporation assumed 
during the first half of the twentieth century.   
In this structure, the corporation's activities were divided 
into product groups, each housed in a separate division with 
operating autonomy.  Division managers controlled operations.  
Central managers, including the board, were responsible for 
strategy.  They monitored the performance of the divisions and 
sanctioned or rewarded them, in particular, by allocating capital 
toward or away from them.  This structure further distanced 
senior managers from front-line operations.  By causing them to 
specialize in financial monitoring across a broad range of 
                                                                                                             
securities law violation or breach of fiduciary duty.  28 C.F.R. 205.3(b).  
Moreover, the duty to report under the new 1.13 does not apply if the lawyer 
“reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interests of the 
organization.”  Sarbanes-Oxley contains no such qualification. 
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products, it reduced the importance of expertise in and 
knowledge of operations.  At the same time, it intensified the 
conflict of interest between lower and upper management by 
drawing a clear line between central and divisional 
management.52 
 Coffee's response to the problems of managerial 
ambiguity and ignorance was to modify this structure to 
introduce bridges between central and divisional management.  
Thus, he proposed "mini-boards" – divisional committees 
composed of central board members and operating managers 
that reported to the board and transmitted its policies. 
 In the years since Coffee's analysis, however, both the 
self-image and the structure of American business organizations 
have changed.  Developments have altered the features he saw 
as reinforcing pressures toward ambiguity and ignorance and 
created countervailing pressures toward inquiry and articulation.  
The change seems to have been prompted by intensified product 
competition and by advances in communications and 
information technology.  Product competition has required 
firms’ operations to become more flexible and dynamic.  
Technology has facilitated new forms of decentralization.  Both 
as norm and description, Ambivalent Bureaucracy has been 
challenged by a new model, which might be called Self-
Conscious Bureaucracy.53 
 To begin with, the multidivisional firm is no longer in 
fashion.  Neither is the preeminence of finance over operations.  
Firms are encouraged to focus on "core competences," and 
senior managers are expected to act less like bankers, and more 
like entrepreneurs.  There is a tendency for hierarchy to be 
compressed and for lines of authority to cross horizontally.  
Product development and production occur through shifting 
                                                 
52  Id. at 1132-36. 
53  See, e.g., Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Science of 
the Learning Organization (1994); Richard B. Chase, F. Robert Jacobs, 
Nicholas J. Aquilano, Operations Management for Competitive Advantage 
(10th ed. 2004). 
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collaborations across specialties both within the firm, and as 
firms outsource more and collaborate more intensely with their 
suppliers and customers, across firms.  In such circumstances, 
coordination is achieved less by command-and-control authority 
structures and more by "shared vision."  Firms that have gone 
furthest along these lines see themselves as "learning 
organizations" engaged in continuous innovation. 
 Senior managers in such organizations are expected to 
take a "systems approach."  This means they are alert to the 
myriad shifting influences on and elements of the firm's 
activities.  New information technologies make collection, 
retrieval, and analysis of a far broader range of data than 
previously.  Data recorded by lower-tier workers can be 
accessed and analyzed instantly by people physically and 
organizationally remote from these workers.   
 In this new context, personal relations of deference and 
loyalties independent of the firm's articulated goals are more 
difficult to maintain.  Relationships now shift so rapidly that 
they do not have time to gel even provisionally.  In any given 
collaboration, it is likely to be more difficult to determine who 
is senior to whom.  Moreover, key monitoring and even 
evaluation functions are more likely to be performed by people 
who have no strong personal contact with the person monitored 
or evaluated.  And monitoring is likely to be at once more 
pervasive and more intensive. 
 Some of the strongest pressures of this organization 
approach are toward articulation and inquiry. 
 Articulation.  Clear and explicit policy becomes important 
in these circumstances for many reasons.  "Say what you do, 
and do what you say," is a basic maxim.54  Pervasive 
                                                 
54  The ISO 14000 Handbook 196 (Joseph Cascio ed. 1996).  ISO 14000 
designates a series of environmental management standards promulgated by 
the International Organization for Standards, and ISO 9000, cited in the next 
note, refers to the organization's product quality management standards.  The 
standards are commonly used as internal guidelines, and hundreds of 
companies require their suppliers to certify their compliance with them. 
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documentation of policy and practice is prescribed in order to 
obviate the ambiguity and inconsistency of oral communication.  
Part of the idea is to eliminate dependence on informal 
relations.  "The objective is to make the operational process 
substantially independent of individuals, so that any 
appropriately experienced and trained individual could make the 
system work."55 
In the Self-Conscious Bureaucracy, policy, rather than 
being promulgated from above or evolving informally, is 
negotiated explicitly at many levels.  In the absence of stable 
linear authority, people find more need of explicit policy for 
guidance.  Communication across positions, disciplines, and 
firms puts a premium on explication.  People have to be 
prepared to work with others they have never met before and 
who do not share a common educational background or 
professional orientation.  They cannot appeal to the body of 
tacit understanding and commitments that members of the same 
profession might share.56  They thus have to be explicit to be 
understood.   
In addition, forcing people to state their premises 
explicitly is a basic heuristic strategy of the "learning 
organization."  It forces people to examine and to expose to 
criticism by others assumptions they might otherwise have 
taken for granted.  Moreover, explicit description of practices 
facilitates learning across positions and firms.  People look for 
"best practices" developed by leading performers in the field, 
but these practices can only be adopted by outsiders if they have 
been intelligibly described. 
Evasion of issues or risk and uncertainty is viewed as 
pathological.  "Risk management" is a key function in the Self-
Conscious Bureaucracy.  Managers are expected to identify 
                                                 
55  The ISO 9000 Handbook 304 (3d ed., Robert Peach ed.,1997). 
56  See, e.g., id. at 200: "A typical auditor's question, 'What would 
happen if X, Y, or Z left your company tomorrow?' indicates the importance 
of maintaining written procedures and directions for work." 
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risks, formulate strategies for limiting them, and update the 
strategies in the light of experience.57 
 Inquiry.  In the Ambivalent Bureaucracy, the key formal 
function of  management is to issue policy.  Monitoring 
sometimes comes as an afterthought.  The formal model of the 
organization encourages a naïve tendency to see policy as self-
implementing and hence monitoring as superfluous.  To the 
extent that the practical reality of the corporation takes the form 
of informal hierarchies of personal deference and loyalty, 
monitoring is difficult because informal practices are opaque to 
the monitors.  In the new style, the commitment to "say what 
you do and do what you say" mitigates these problems.   
Moreover, in the new organization, monitoring is 
critical, not merely as means to insure compliance with settled 
policy, but as part of the process of continuous re-assessment 
and revision.  The new organizational style collapses the 
distinction between policy-making and monitoring.  
Implementation of policy generates experience and information 
that can be used to improve it.  Senior managers have to stay in 
touch with rank-and-file actors (and involve them in the process 
of revision) in order to capture the benefits of these lessons. 
Policy tends to take a different form in the new style.  
Formal policy in the Ambivalent Bureaucracy is 
characteristically binary; it specifies thresholds that must be met 
unconditionally, and when met, constitute unconditional 
compliance.  Rules of this kind continue to play a role in the 
new style, but they co-exist with different kinds of norms 
implied by the ideal of continuous improvement: moving targets 
and scaled measurements.  The policies specify targets and 
require actors to demonstrate progress toward them.  The targets 
are revised as progress is made.  Satisfactory progress is often 
measured by comparison to the performance of comparable 
plants or firms.  This latter type of norm requires senior 
                                                 
57  See, e.g., Thomas Barton, William Shenkir, and Paul Walker, Making 
Enterprise Risk Management Pay Off (2002). 
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managers to take a greater interest in monitoring.  Performance 
under such norms cannot be meaningfully summarized by a 
conclusory judgment of compliance.  It is critical to know 
where on the scale the actors are performing.   
Finally, monitoring tends to be very broad in the new 
style of organization.  The strategy of deliberate selective 
ignorance, in which senior managers watch matters such as 
sales and revenues that are important to them but overlook 
performance with respect to matters of public interest, is not a 
real option for these organizations.  This is partly a function of 
changes in legal rules we shall shortly consider.  For 
corporations sensitive to adverse publicity, it is a function of 
public relations.  But more fundamentally, it arises from the fact 
that management cannot reliably determine which aspects of the 
corporation's performance are irrelevant even to its narrow 
selfish goals.58  
In a dynamic business environment, the critical 
indicators of effective performance are not stable.  In choosing 
strategic ignorance, management takes risks that the 
information it dispenses with will turn out to be important to its 
goals.  If, for example, management cannot tell whether high 
sales figures reflect bribery of purchasing agents or customer 
satisfaction with its product, it cuts itself off from important 
product development information.  If it cannot tell whether the 
lower costs of a particular plan represent more efficient 
processes or more lax compliance with environmental norms, it 
impairs its ability to make key investment decisions.  In a more 
stable business environment, the strategic benefits of such 
                                                 
58  The pressures to monitor in the new model are countered by liability 
concerns.  A harsh and erratic liability system will make even law-abiding 
firms hesitate to make their operations transparent.  These counter-pressures 
can be redeced by reforms that mitigate liability when the defendant makes 
monitoring and disclosure efforts.  See Jennifer Arlen and Reinier 
Kraakman, "Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate 
Liability Regimes," 72 New York University Law Review 687 (1997). 
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ignorance might have been worth the price, but the premise of 
the new industrial organization is that organizations can no 
longer afford it.  
The Self-Conscious Bureaucracy model remains so far 
simply a tendency in some quarters of business, and it may not 
be plausible for some fields of enterprise.  Although Enron 
portrayed itself as an embodiment of the most progressive and 
innovative tendencies in business organization, it more strongly 
resembled older models in its visceral and strategic tolerance of 
ignorance and ambiguity.59   
 
IV. The Trend Toward Legal Duties of Inquiry and 
Articulation 
 
The trend in business practices toward transparency has 
been paralleled and reinforced by contemporaneous legal 
developments that have prescribed duties of inquiry and 
articulation. 
A. Duties of Inquiry.   
In 1963, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Graham v. 
Allis Chalmers that directors had no duty to initiate monitoring 
or compliance procedures in the absence of specific evidence of 
managerial wrongdoing.60  The case arose out of price fixing in 
                                                 
59  In a pioneering article Robert Eli Rosen portrays Enron as an example 
of the “redesigned corporation,” his name for some of the same tendencies I 
summarize under the rubric of Self-Conscious Bureaucracy.  “Risk 
Management and Corporate Governance: The Case of Enron,” 35 Conn. L. 
Rev. 157 (2003).  Although I learned a lot from it, I think he is wrong to 
associate Enron with the new model.  He treats decentralization as a novel 
feature of the new model, when in fact, the literature cited in notes 35 and 36 
above shows that it was a central, albeit tacit, feature of the old one.  Second, 
he underestimates the importance in the new model of the features of 
transparency that Enron so strikingly lacked. 
60  As the Court tendentiously put it, "[A]bsent cause for suspicion there 
is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of 
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect 
exists."  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, 188 A2d 125, 130 (1963). 
 36
violation of the antitrust laws.  The corporation had been held 
liable in public and private enforcement actions, and 
shareholders brought a derivative suit against directors seeking 
reimbursement for the corporation's loss.  The misconduct in 
question involved the violation of laws intended to protect the 
corporation's customers, rather than its shareholders.  It seems 
likely that the court would have been more sympathetic to a 
claim based on shareholder protection norms, such as 
constraints on managerial self-dealing.  Nevertheless, the court's 
language was harsh and categorical, and the case stood for 
decades for a basically reactive conception of director duty that 
did not require affirmative efforts to elicit information.   
In 1996, Delaware Chancellor William Allen suggested 
in a widely noted opinion that, although never explicitly 
repudiated, the Allis-Chalmers case was no longer good law.  
He argued that the directors' duties embraced some 
responsibility to determine "that the corporation's information 
and reporting systems are in concept and design adequate to 
assure the board that appropriate information will come to its 
attention in a timely manner."61  Allen's dictum reflects a steady 
trend toward the recognition of duties  of inquiry.  Examples 
include these: 
-- A longstanding doctrine of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence holds that for some purposes "willful blindness" 
or "conscious avoidance" can be treated as knowledge of the 
facts ignored.62  In recent decades, the federal courts have 
invigorated this principle in criminal fraud prosecutions under a 
variety of statutes.63  Where the defendants are lawyers or 
                                                 
61  In Re Caremark International, Inc., Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 
959,     (Del.Ch.1996). 
62  See David Luban, "Contrived Ignorance," 87 Georgetown Law 
Journal 957 (1999), which is useful both for its survey of doctrine and its 
acute discussion of the moral blameworthiness of deliberate ignorance. 
63  U.S. v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Nicholson, 
677 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Cronin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1310 (5th 
Cir. 1994).  The cases say that "(1) subjective awareness of a high 
probability of illegal conduct [by an associate or agent] and (2) purposeful 
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accountants, the cases suggest that their failure to use modes of 
inquiry that are customary within the profession can be taken as 
deliberate, and hence culpable ignorance.  Thus, United States 
v. Benjamin sustained the conviction of an accountant for 
securities fraud despite his uncontradicted claim that he had 
merely incorporated information provided by the client in the 
statements he prepared and had no specific reason to know they 
were false.  The court held that the accountant's failure to 
adhere to verification practices recognized within the profession 
sufficed to establish scienter.64   
-- Perhaps most influential has been the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines for corporate defendants enacted in 
1991.  These guidelines provide a presumptive penalty for 
corporate criminal liability of a fine of several times the amount 
                                                                                                             
contrivance to avoid learning of the illegal conduct" establishes scienter.  
Nicholson, 677 F.2d at 710.  This does not seem quite right.  Subjective 
awareness alone amounts to knowledge if the probability is high enough.  
What these cases imply is that proof of a lower probability is sufficient 
where the defendant ignored customary or readily available means of 
inquiry.   
 A related line of authority in the securities field holds that 
"recklessness" can establish scienter for civil liability purposes.  See Hazen, 
cited in note    , at 592-94.  
 Some statutes and cases impose liability on corporations and even 
their managers without regard to knowledge.  They are designed to induce 
monitoring, but unlike the "deliberate ignorance" doctrine, they penalize 
ignorance without regard to its blameworthiness.  Such practices seem 
dubious in the criminal sphere, where blameworthy conduct and a culpable 
mental state traditionally have been pre-requisites for liability.  Some would 
suggest that even many of the "deliberate ignorance" scenarios are 
inappropriate for criminal treatment.  For a seminal discussion of these 
matters, see John C. Coffee, Jr., "Does Unlawful Mean Criminal?: 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction," 71 Boston 
University Law Review 193 (1991).  It is no part of my argument to defend 
strict liability for blameless ignorance, nor to defend any preference for 
criminal over civil sanctioning of deliberate ignorance.  My point is merely 
that deliberate ignorance is increasingly and appropriately regarded as both 
blameworthy and a basis for some form of liability. 
64  328 F. 2d 854 (1964). 
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of harm done by the violation.  They then prescribe mitigating 
factors that can reduce substantially the presumptive penalty, 
including "an effective program to prevent and detect violations 
of law."65 
-- Delaware Supreme Court cases on director duty of 
care since the 1980s have re-strengthened the duty of care in 
substantial part by emphasizing the board's duty to demand and 
consider information in connection with major strategic 
decisions.  Cases like Smith v. Van Gorkom suggest that the 
board deference traditionally mandated by the "business 
judgment" rule is conditioned on the board's adequately 
informing itself in connection with the decision at issue.  People 
sometimes now speak of the board's "duty to become informed" 
as a distinct element of the fiduciary duty of care.66 
-- Several states have created "environmental audit" 
privileges that immunize firms from liability for violations that 
the firms discover, promptly report, and correct.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency has an announced 
presumption against prosecution in such circumstances.67 
-- In widely noted decisions applying the employment 
discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act to sexual 
harassment, the Supreme Court indicated that employer liability 
for harassing conduct by its agents would depend in substantial 
part on the extent to which the employer had "exercised 
reasonable care to avoid harassment and eliminate it where it 
might occur."  The court mentioned reporting and monitoring 
procedures as elements of such care.68 
                                                 
65  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, sec. 8C2.5(f). 
66  Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del.1985); Jeffrey Bauman, 
Elliott J. Weiss, and Alan R. Palmiter, Corporations: Law and Policy 652 
(5th ed. 2003).   
67  See Arlen and Kraakman, cited in note 58, at 742-52 and sources 
cited therein at notes 7-8. 
68  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998); 
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
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-- Several statutes and regulations have required firms in 
various industries to perform "risk analysis", requiring inquiry 
and explicit planning with respect to various kinds of hazards.69 
 B. Duties of Clarity.   
 Two types of doctrinal evolution have implicitly 
intensified the responsibility of people for the foreseeable harm 
of ambiguity in statements or conduct with which they are 
associated. 
 First, there is the law of fraud.  There appears to have 
been a gradual tendency in misrepresentation doctrine to shift 
responsibility for ambiguity from the addressee, who bore it 
traditionally under notions such as "caveat emptor", to the 
speaker.  The new position is set out in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts which classifies as actionable 
misrepresentation, not only false statements, but ambiguous 
statements that are foreseeably misleading.  Under section 527, 
a statement susceptible to both a true interpretation and a false 
interpretation is fraudulent if the speaker expects the addressee 
to understand it in the false sense.  Indeed, it is sufficient for 
liability that the speaker shows "reckless indifference" as to 
how the addressee will understand it.  Thus, a used car dealer 
who describes a car as a "Rolls", knowing that is a low-value 
Rolls Joyce but expecting the customer to understand that it is a 
high value Rolls Royce, is liable.  The Restatement also 
explicitly creates liability for misleadingly incomplete 
statements (statements that are misleading because of the 
"omission to state additional or qualifying matter").70   
 The second development that bears on ambiguity is the 
growth of secondary liability doctrine – aiding-and-abetting and 
conspiracy.  These doctrines are specifically addressed to 
                                                 
69  Bao Q. Tran and Jonathan P. Tomes, "Risk Analysis: Your Key to 
Compliance," ACC Docket (November-December 2003), at 38-54 
(identifying about 25 laws requiring some form of "risk analysis"). 
70  Restatement (2d) of Torts, sec.s 527, 529.  The securities law fraud 
standard is at least as broad.  Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, VII Securities 
Regulation 3419-27 (3d ed. 2003). 
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conduct that, viewed in isolation, is innocent or ambiguous, but 
seems wrongful when viewed in conjunction with other 
activities.  In a common scenario, a professional provides 
services – for example, brokering or the preparation of financial 
statements – for a transaction in which she knows that one party 
is making fraudulent representations to the other.  If her own 
conduct does not involve explicit misrepresentation but 
knowingly assists the fraud of another, she is likely to be 
secondarily liable.  There has been a marked growth in this type 
of secondary liability in recent decades.71    
 C.  Sarbanes-Oxley.   
 The most pervasive themes of the corporate control 
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -- Congress's 
response to Enron and related scandals -- concern ignorance and 
ambiguity. 
 The 1933 and 1934 securities acts were primarily 
concerned to mandate disclosure by managers to investors.  Key 
Sarbanes-Oxley provisions are concerned with inducing 
disclosures within management.  The older provisions appear to 
have assumed that obligations of external reporting would 
induce the firms to arrange adequate internal information flows.  
Sarbanes-Oxley represents a recognition that strategies of 
deliberate ignorance may impede effective information 
management.   
The key provisions mandate "internal controls."  The 
CEO and CFO are required to sign annual and warrant that they 
are not misleading "based on the officer's knowledge."  The 
statute then proceeds to give these officers the responsibility for 
designing "internal controls to ensure that material information 
relating to the issuer … is made known to such officers by 
others within these entities."72  As the Fried Frank firm puts it in 
                                                 
71  E.g., Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788 (Or. 1999); U.S. v. Cueto, 
151 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 1998); Loser v. Superior Court, 177 P.2d 320 (Cal. 
App. 1947); U.S. v. Teitler, 802 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1986). 
72  Sec. 302(a)(4)(B); 15 U.S.C. 7241.  As Lawrence Cunningham points 
out, most of these provisions are, in a strict legal sense, redundant of pre-
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a client memo, this "makes it more difficult for [officers] to 
disclaim knowledge of their company's disclosure."73 
This basic provision is supplemented by four other ones 
designed to induce corporate agents to provide information to 
senior managers.  First, the general whistle-blowing provision 
requires the audit committee to establish procedures for 
receiving and responding to complaints, including confidential 
and anonymous ones from employees, regarding auditing and 
accounting matters.74 
Second, there is the "up-the-ladder" reporting provision 
for lawyers.  Under this provision, a lawyer for an issuer who 
encounters evidence of a securities law or fiduciary duty 
violation by an agent of the client must report it to the chief 
executive officer or chief legal officer, and if the officer in 
question fails to "respond appropriately," to a board committee 
with only independent directors.75 
Third, the statute obliges auditors to report to the audit 
committee "all critical accounting policies and practices to be 
used," the possible alternatives, and the ramifications of the 
different approaches.76 
Fourth, the auditors must involve the Audit Committee 
in decisions about "critical accounting policies."  They have to 
inform the Committee where decisions among alternative 
treatments involve large stakes and of communications from 
managers on these issues.77 
                                                                                                             
existing law.  Their primary effect is rhetorical and hortatory, although as 
Cunningham also points out, that doesn't mean they won't have substantial 
effect.  Lawrence A. Cunningham, "The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy 
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work)," 35 Connecticut Law 
Review 915 (2003). 
73  Dixie Johnson and Karl Groskaufmanis, "FFHSJ Client 
Memorandum: The Post-Enron Corporate Governance Environment," 1366 
PLI/Corp 907, 923 (Westlaw 2003). 
74  Sec. 301(m)(5); 15 U.S.C. 78j(5), retaliation cite 
75  Sec. 307, 15 U.S.C. 7245. 
76  Sec. 108(k); 15 U.S.C. 77s(k). 
77  Sec. 204; 15 U.S.C. 78j-l. 
 42
The statute thus gives protections to the whistle-blowers, 
and it creates a duty for the lawyers and accountants.  Its main 
thrust, however, is to require the board to encourage the 
communication of and to receive information it might otherwise 
not want to be exposed to.  Firms have always been free to 
establish whistle-blower policies and to demand reporting from 
their lawyers and accountants.  They have not consistently done 
so.  Now they must. 
Sarbanes-Oxley also makes a distinctive response to the 
problem of calculated ambiguity.  It requires the firm and its 
auditors to consider and identify the limitations of their own 
disclosures.  Annual reports must now include an "internal 
control report" that assesses the "effectiveness of the internal 
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting".78  They are specifically to identify "all significant 
deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls which 
could adversely affect" financial reporting.79   
These demands to explicitly identify ambiguities and 
weakness may represent a new stage in the evolution of 
disclosure law, one that resonates with the evolution of the 
modern business structure toward hyper-articulateness.  To 
some extent, they seem redundant.  As the Restatement makes 
clear, the basic fraud standard already required that ambiguities 
and weaknesses be identified where there would otherwise be a 
strong risk of misunderstanding.  But the new standards seem 
more exigent in two ways.  First, they appear to lower the 
threshold at which explication is required.  Ambiguities that 
might not have amounted to a substantial risk of 
misunderstanding in the past may have to be explicated.  
Second and most important, they seem designed to foster the 
kind of continuous revision in disclosure practice that the new 
industrial organization encourages in other matters.  By forcing 
greater articulation of premises, the new provisions facilitate 
                                                 
78  Sec. 404(a), 15 U.S.C. 7262. 
79  Sec. 302(a)(5); 15 U.S.C. 7241(a)(5). 
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comparison of practices across firms by both investors and the 
firms themselves.  By observing their peers, the firms can get 
more insight into different disclosure possibilities and their 
effects.   
 
V.  Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and the Bar's 
Resistance to Accountability 
 
There are two competing intuitions as to how the trend 
toward transparency in business organization might affect 
lawyers.  On the one hand, one might expect lawyers to adopt 
their clients' perspectives.  Clearly, they must take account of 
their clients' views to provide them satisfactory service, and the 
natural tendency to identify with clients might encourage the 
absorption of the clients' ideas and attitudes.  Thus, one might 
expect those segments of the bar that work for clients in the 
industries in which the new trends are most developed to adapt 
their own firms to these trends.  
On the other hand, lawyers have some autonomy from 
their clients by virtue of their independent organizational base 
and their expert knowledge of technical matters.  One might 
expect them to use this independence to resist the trend toward 
transparency.  Transparency measures are designed to enforce 
kinds of accountability that can be threatening.  Moreover, the 
bar has a traditional ideological commitment, and perhaps an 
economic stake, in confidentiality norms that are in tension with 
some transparency measures.   
The intuition that ideology and/or self-interest might 
incline the bar to resist the trend toward transparency receives 
support from the bar's reaction to section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, which concerns the regulation of lawyers.  This section 
authorizes and instructs the SEC to promulgate regulations 
"setting forth minimum standards of professional conduct for 
attorneys" in federal securities practice. These standards must 
include "up-the-ladder" reporting for corporate counsel.  Where 
attorneys encounter "evidence of a material violation of the 
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securities law or breach of fiduciary duty," they must report it to 
the CEO or chief legal officer.  If the officer does not 
"appropriately respond", the attorney must go to the audit 
committee or another committee of independent directors.80   
In November, 2002, the SEC proposed rules 
implementing the "up-the-ladder" requirement and adding a 
requirement of "noisy withdrawal".  The latter would prescribe 
that, in situations where the board failed to respond 
appropriately to an "up-the-ladder" report, the attorney must 
withdraw and give notice to the SEC that she had withdrawn 
"for professional reasons."81  The SEC subsequently withdrew 
the proposal that the attorney give notice to the SEC and 
proposed instead that the company give the notice.  (The revised 
proposal parallels the duties of a company when an auditor 
resigns.)82 
Section 307 has the information-forcing and 
articulation-forcing characteristics that we have noted as central 
themes of Sarbanes-Oxley corporate governance regulation.  
From the board's perspective, the main effect of "up-the-ladder" 
reporting is to force information on the directors that they 
always had a right to demand but might have preferred not to 
receive.  From the lawyer's perspective, the main effect is 
reduce the ambiguity about the relevant duties that prior 
doctrine failed to resolve, and in fact, actively cultivated.   
The bar's truculent response to the SEC's implementing 
efforts reflects its longstanding resistance to outside regulation 
generally.  It also shows a visceral clinging to the prerogatives 
of ignorance and ambiguity.  The corporate sector of the 
profession seems unable to reconcile its own image and 
activities with the principles that now undeniably govern its 
clients. 
                                                 
80  15 U.S.C. 7245 
81  Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct 
for Attorneys, Release Nos. 33-8186, 34-47282; available at 
sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8186.htm 
82         17 C.F.R. § 229.304. 
 45
 The issue of deliberate ignorance was implicitly at stake 
in the debate over the cognitive threshold that would trigger 
duties to report "up-the-ladder".  The statute refers to 
"evidence" of a violation, which suggests something 
considerably short of certainty that a violation is occurring.  The 
SEC's initial proposal triggered reporting duties when a lawyer 
"reasonably believe[d]" that a violation had occurred, was 
occurring, or will occur; the final rule defines the trigger as 
circumstances in which "it would be unreasonable, under the 
circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to 
conclude that it is reasonably likely that" a violation has 
occurred, is occurring or will occur.  Both phrases are awkward, 
and the latter is an affront to English style, but the general thrust 
of both seems recognizable.  Each suggests an "objective" 
standard under which mere lack of knowledge would not 
exonerate unless the lawyer had behaved reasonably, and in 
particular, had made the inquiries that a reasonable lawyer 
would undertake.83 
 Many segments of the bar, however, protested strenuously 
against any "objective standard."  In particular, they urged the 
SEC to adopt the standard of the Model Rules provisions 
regarding misrepresentation.  The Model Rules forbid 
"knowing" misrepresentation and the define "know" to mean 
"actual knowledge" – a subjective standard that seems to deny 
any duty to inquire.84  Lawyers pressed the SEC to incorporate 
this standard arguing, first, that it would promote desirable 
uniformity with state standards, and second, that it would spare 
                                                 
83  While her frustration at the contorted language is understandable, I 
think Susan Koniak is wrong to predict that the standard will be interpreted 
as closer to a subjective one.  Susan P. Koniak, "When the Hurlyburly's 
Done: The Bar's Struggle With the SEC," 103 Columbia Law Review 1236, 
1274-76 (2003). 
84  Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3, 4.1 (forbidding knowing 
misrepresentation); "Terminology" (definition of "knows").  Koniak argues 
that the "actual knowledge" standard reflects that, "In the bar's normative 
universe, lawyers never know."  Cited in note 82, at 1247. 
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lawyers the difficulties of having to determine the meaning in 
particular situations of an objective standard.85    
These were arguments of desperation.  An objective 
cognitive standard resembling both the proposed and final one 
already governed some professional duties under the Model 
Rules, and it defined the lawyer's duty of care to clients under 
the common law duty of care.86  Organizational clients are 
subject to standards of reasonable knowledge (and hence 
inquiry) under the negligence norms of myriad regulatory 
regimes.  Lawyers advise clients on the application of such 
standards routinely.  If taken seriously, the lawyers' professed 
inability to apply such standards to their own conduct would be 
a confession of astonishing incompetence.  In fact, however, it 
was a plea to retain the privileges of deliberate ignorance as a 
defense against accountability. 
 Calculated ambiguity was a tacit theme in the bar's push 
to limit the intrusion of the SEC rules on state disciplinary rules.  
The bar had long opposed SEC regulation of lawyers on the 
ground that it would displace the traditional regulatory authority 
of the states.87  Once 307 was enacted, it had to live with 
federally-mandated "up-the-ladder" reporting, since the statute 
was specific on that point.  But it vehemently opposed "noisy 
                                                 
85  See, e.g., Comments of Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, American 
Bar Association, (December 18, 2003), at 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcalrtonhtm. 
86  ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "Terminology", 
(defining reasonably should know" to include what a lawyer "of reasonable 
competence and prudence would ascertain"); 2.3(a) (duty to explain to 
corporate constituent that lawyer represents entity when lawyer "reasonably 
should know" constituent's interests are adverse to entitity); 2.4 (duty to get 
clients consent for distribution of opinion when lawyer "reasonably should 
know" addressee intends further distribution); 3.6 (duties with respect to trial 
statements that lawyer "reasonably should know" will be publicly 
disseminated); 4.4b (duty to return privileged document that lawyer 
"reasonably should know" was inadvertently sent by opposing counsel).  For 
recognition that the "should know" standard is implicit in the common law 
duty of care, see, e.g.,  
87  See Koniak, cited in note 82, at 1248-60,  
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withdrawal" arguing that Congress could not have intended 
such an extension abrogation of deference to state lawyer 
regulation.88  The extent to which the tradition of state lawyer 
regulation is entitled to respect in any circumstances is open to 
debate.  Arguably, the state processes have dominated by 
lawyers acting from narrowly selfish motives.  Even if we 
assume they have some general legitimacy, it would be 
extremely implausible for the SEC to defer to them in a matter 
it deemed integral to the securities laws.  The securities laws are 
plainly intended to create a national system with a federally-
defined floor of practice standards uniform across states. 
 But for our purposes, the key point is to recognize the 
connection between the appeal to state regulation and the 
preference for ambiguity.  One source of ambiguity is the 
choice-of-law issue involved in state regulation of multistate 
transactions.  The ABA codes had no choice-of-law rule until 
1993.89  The new rule, which looks for most non-litigation 
situations to the rules of the state that has licensed the lawyer, is 
controversial and has not been universally adopted.90  Even 
where it is adopted and settles the issue for individual lawyers, 
it leaves potential problems of predictability and coordination 
where lawyers from more than one state collaborate, as 
commonly occurs in securities matters.91 
 Much more fundamental, however, is the fact that 
ambiguity was the dominant characteristic of the ABA's rule on 
                                                 
88  See e.g., Carleton, cited in note    ; Comments of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York (April 7, 2003), at 
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/abcny040703.htm; Comments of 
Professor Joseph Grundfest and various Silicon Valley lawyers (December 
23, 2002), at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jagrundfest.htm.  
89  Model Rule 8.5c.  See the ABA Committee Report excerpted in 
Stephen Gillers and Roy Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and 
Standards 448-49 (2002). 
90  See id. at 450-52. 
91  For example, while "up-the-ladder" reporting has been permissive 
under Model Rule 1.13 as adopted in most states, it has been mandatory in 
four.  Id. at  
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corporate representation and the variations adopted by most 
states until the threat of Sarbanes-Oxley pre-emption forced 
some clarification in 2003.  Before then, the rule gave no 
guidance as to when the lawyer should go to the board, and was 
unclear as to whether she was even allowed to go beyond it.  
And while the rule has clearly never required “noisy 
withdrawal,” it remains unclear whether it permits it.  To prefer 
the state regime is to treat ambiguity as a virtue. 
 The bar failed in its efforts on behalf of an objective 
standard and strong deference to state rules (although it has so 
far fended off the strongest of the proposed departures from 
state norms – "noisy withdrawal").  However, one provision of 
the SEC's final rule under section 307 does seem unfortunately 
responsive to the bar's pleas.  In general, when board reports 
evidence of illegal conduct to the CEO or chief legal officer, 
she must determine that their response is "appropriate".  This 
would be satisfied where the response gave the lawyer reason to 
believe either that there has been no misconduct or that 
effective remedial steps have been taken.  Otherwise, she must 
proceed to the board or a committee of independent directors.  
However, the final rule creates an exception.  The lawyer need 
not proceed further if, after reporting to the CEO or chief legal 
officer, she is informed that the board approved retention of 
another lawyer to look into the matter and the other lawyer has 
determined that he can ethically "assert a colorable defense on 
behalf of the issuer … in any investigation or judicial or 
administrative proceeding relating to the reported evidence of a 
material violation." 
 Although it remains to be seen what the influence of this 
provision will be, it seems unfortunately conducive to 
pathologies of deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity.  
The effect of the provision is to authorize two types of 
ignorance.  When the second lawyer gives the requisite opinion, 
the lawyer is excused from going to the board.  So the board 
does not have to be confronted with his information.  (This 
effect is mitigated by the requirement that the board itself have 
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approved retaining the second lawyer, but that fact raises the 
question of what point there is in excusing the first lawyer's 
report.)   
Moreover, it appears that the first lawyer has no duty to 
assess the qualifications of the second lawyer or the quality of 
his investigation.  In the normal duty-of-care situation, a lawyer 
would not be justified in relying on a second lawyer's opinion 
about what should be done without plausibly determining that 
the opinion was well supported (and even it were, would often 
have a responsibility to make her own assessment of the merits).  
Without such a responsibility on the part of the first lawyer, 
there is no check on the ability of a board in bad faith from 
shopping for a compliant  second lawyer. 
 And the "second opinion" exception contains a salient 
ambiguity.  The "colorable issue" language and the reference to 
proceedings suggests that threshold of plausibility required for 
counsel to present a claim to a tribunal.  This standard requires 
no more than that the claim be more than "frivolous."92  Since 
this standard regulates positions that the client will take 
publicly, the only concern competing with the client's interests 
is the danger of wasting the tribunal's time.  However, it would 
trivialize the "up-the-ladder" rule to apply this standard to 
situations where no proceeding was pending and whether the 
matter becomes public may depend on what the attorneys do 
under the rule.  The fact that some lawyer has been found who 
thinks the client has a non-frivolous defense to claims of 
wrongdoing is of small moment if the effect of the judgment is 
that the client's conduct will remain unknown and the claim will 
never be made.   
It is possible that the SEC meant the rule to apply only 
where claims have been made publicly or are about to be made, 
but the rule is phrased much more broadly.  It is also possible 
that the SEC intended to create a transparently low standard and 
                                                 
92  See Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3. 
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just drafted it badly.93  But so far, the effect of its efforts has 
been to preserve a substantial measure of space for the kind of 
ignorance and ambiguity in which the bar has traditionally taken 
refuge from pressures of accountability. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Deliberate ignorance and calculated ambiguity are key 
themes in major scandals from Watergate to Enron.  Until 
recently, these practices were encouraged by both legal doctrine 
and organizational structure.  Recent trends in both law and 
organization have narrowed the space for them by enlarging 
duties of inquiry and articulation. 
Enron seems to be a watershed in this evolution.  
Although it advertised itself as a highly advanced business 
organization, in its aversion to transparency and accountability, 
it resembled the Ambivalent Bureaucracy model of past years 
more than the newer model I call Self-Conscious Bureaucracy.  
The inquiry- and articulation forcing features of Sarbanes-
Oxley, while simply an intensification of prior trends, 
appropriately increase legal pressures for organizations to move 
toward the newer model. 
It remains to be seen, however, how these pressures will 
affect lawyers.  The bar continues to resist some responsibilities 
of sort that are being imposed on its clients, and its own norms 
continue to both reflect and encourage deliberate ignorance and 
calculated ambiguity.   
                                                 
93  Koniak believes that the rule was intended to be applied broadly as a 
concession to the bar.  Cited in note 82, at 1275-78.  The attempt to import 
the "colorable defense" standard to the sphere of disclosure regulation was a 
major (and highly dubious) tactic of the defenders of the Kaye Scholer firm 
against the misconduct charges arising out of its representation of Charles 
Keating and Lincoln Savings and Loan.  See William H. Simon, "The Kaye 
Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of 
Evasion and Apology," 23 Law & Social Inquiry 243, 270-73 (2003). 
